The criteria that are used by the courts in England and Wales to determeine whether or not Leave to Remove is to be granted.

The criteria governing Leave to Remove:

Thorpe LJ in Payne v Payne:

40.	However there is a danger that if the regard which the court pays to the reasonable proposals of the primary carer were elevated into a legal presumption then there would be an obvious risk of the breach of the respondent's rights not only under Article 8 but also his rights under Article 6 to a fair trial. To guard against the risk of too perfunctory an investigation resulting from too ready an assumption that the mother's proposals are necessarily compatible with the child's welfare I would suggest the following discipline as a prelude to conclusion:

(a) Pose the question: is the mother's application genuine in the sense that it is not motivated by some selfish desire to exclude the father from the child's life. Then ask is the mother's application realistic, by which I mean founded on practical proposals both well researched and investigated? If the application fails either of these tests refusal will inevitably follow.

(b) If however the application passes these tests then there must be a careful appraisal of the father's opposition: is it motivated by genuine concern for the future of the child's welfare or is it driven by some ulterior motive? What would be the extent of the detriment to him and his future relationship with the child were the application granted? To what extent would that be offset by extension of the child's relationships with the maternal family and homeland?

(c) What would be the impact on the mother, either as the single parent or as a new wife, of a refusal of her realistic proposal?

(d) The outcome of the second and third appraisals must then be brought into an overriding review of the child's welfare as the paramount consideration, directed by the statutory checklist insofar as appropriate.

41.	In suggesting such a discipline I would not wish to be thought to have diminished the importance that this court has consistently attached to the emotional and psychological well-being of the primary carer. In any evaluation of the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration great weight must be given to this factor.

Thorpe LJ in Re B, Re S [2003]:

11.	…. I would, in the light of recent experience of applications and appeals in relocation cases, offer the following extension to subpara (c) of para [40]. Where the mother cares for the child or proposes to care for the child within a new family, the impact of refusal on the new family and the stepfather or prospective stepfather must also be carefully evaluated.

12.	 That consideration applies with greater force in the case where the child’s stepfather is a foreign national. There, as well as work, all his history, his family ties and his loyalties pull in the same direction. If the court frustrates that natural emigration it jeopardises the prospects of the new family’s survival or blights its potential for fulfilment and happiness. That is manifestly contrary to the welfare of any child of that family. That is a reality which the court determining an application for relocation simply has to recognise. Often there will be a price to be paid in welfare terms by the diminution of the children’s contact with their father and his extended family. But the court’s powers to ensure children’s continuing contact with both parents after separation or divorce is necessarily circumscribed. The court has power to support the father who seeks to maintain or extend his relationship with his children through contact. However, if in the aftermath of separation the father takes employment abroad or marries a woman whose employment takes her abroad or who marries a woman whose every connection is with another jurisdiction, the father will accompany her there and the consequential loss or diminution in his contact with the children of the prior relationship cannot be surveyed or controlled by the court. These are the tides of chance and life and in the exercise of its paternalistic jurisdiction it is important that the court should recognise the force of these movements and not frustrate them unless they are shown to be contrary to the welfare of the child.

Butler-Sloss LJ in Payne v Payne:

85.	In summary I would suggest that the following considerations should be in the forefront of the mind of a judge trying one of these difficult cases. They are not and could not be exclusive of the other important matters which arise in the individual case to be decided. All the relevant factors need to be considered, including the points I make below, so far as they are relevant, and weighed in the balance. The points I make are obvious but in view of the arguments presented to us in this case, it may be worthwhile to repeat them.

(a) The welfare of the child is always paramount.

(b) There is no presumption created by section 13(1)(b) in favour of the applicant parent.

(c) The reasonable proposals of the parent with a residence order wishing to live abroad carry great weight.

(d) Consequently the proposals have to be scrutinised with care and the court needs to be satisfied that there is a genuine motivation for the move and not the intention to bring contact between the child and the other parent to an end.

(e) The effect upon the applicant parent and the new family of the child of a refusal of leave is very important.

(f) The effect upon the child of the denial of contact with the other parent and in some cases his family is very important.

(g) The opportunity for continuing contact between the child and the parent left behind may be very significant.

86.	All the above observations have been made on the premise that the question of residence is not a live issue. If, however, there is a real dispute as to which parent should be granted a residence order, and the decision as to which parent is the more suitable is finely balanced, the future plans of each parent for the child are clearly relevant. If one parent intends to set up home in another country and remove the child from school, surroundings and the other parent and his family, it may in some cases be an important factor to weigh in the balance. But in a case where the decision as to residence is clear as the judge in this case clearly thought it was, the plans for removal from the jurisdiction would not be likely to be significant in the decision over residence. The mother in this case already had a residence order and the judge's decision on residence was not an issue before this Court.